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Drastic changes  in  the organization  of the  world  economy  since  1973 
call  for a third edition  of this  essay.  In the past three years,  exchange 
rates  have  been  realigned,  an  international  boom  gave  way  to  deep 
recession, reforms have been introduced into the world's monetary  sys-
tem,  oil  prices  have  quadrupled,  and  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
are in full swing. 
Despite  these changes  and  the  resulting strains  on  the  international 
economy,  the  partnership  between  the  European  Community  (EC) 
and the United States,  based  on  common interests, remains unimpaired. 
The Community  and  America  can  and  must  work  together  to  help 
adjust the international  economic  system  to  changing circumstances. 
The climate of EC-US  relations  can  turn  chilly,  but impatience and 
anger are transient, while interdependence has  become imperative. Nei-
ther  the  United  States  nor  the  Community  could  successfully  pursue 
its  objectives  without  the  cooperation  of  the  other.  Their  common 
political interests impel them to solve a variety of mutual problems. 
A US  spokesman  once  said  that the United States  would  no  longer 
pay  an  economic  price  for  Europe's  non-existent  political  unity.  This 
review  indicates  that  the  United  States  has  benefited,  not  suffered, 
economically  from  Europe's  nascent  unity.  The European  Community 
today,  although not yet  united politically,  is  more than  a great trading 
unit.  It is  an  international  entity,  willing and  able  to  work  with  the 
United States on the world's many problems. 
The Community's  enlargement to  nine  members  makes  its  economy 
more  comparable  to  that  of  the  United  States,  thereby  heightening 
awareness  of its  worldwide responsibilities and of the need  to exercise 
a leadership  role  befitting  its  economic  strength and  cultural  heritage. 
The European  Community is  becoming the  "partner" that US  postwar 
policy has consistently fostered. 
The purpose  of this  booklet  is  threefold:  to  explain  the  effects  of 
the  European  unification  movement,  to  survey  the  frictions  and  mis-
conceptions that have strained EC-US relations, and to analyze the polit-
ical  and  economic means  whereby their common  interests are served. 
5 CHAPTER  I. 
A United Europe 
The impetus for the uniting of Western Europe arose from the identical 
European  and  American  belief  30  years  ago  that  major  steps  had  to 
be  taken  to  promote a  permanent  state  of multilateral  friendship  and 
cooperation  throughout  a  war-torn  continent.  In  the  spring of  1945, 
Europe's political and  economic structures  again  lay  in  ruins.  For the 
second time this century, the massive destructive power of national armies 
had brought death and physical devastation. 
Old antagonisms  between  the European  nation  states had once more 
caused  cataclysmic  problems.  But  there  were  now  two  critical  differ-
ences.  The first  was  the  rise  of the United  States  as  a  world  power. 
Emerging comparatively unscathed from World War II, America found 
itself in  an  international  environment which  precluded  any  revival  of 
its  traditional  isolationism.  The  second  factor  was  the  threat  of  en-
croachment from the Soviet Union and  the start of the Cold  War. An 
international  crisis  was  perceived,  one  which  required  extraordinary 
action. 
7 To speed Europe's economic recovery, redirect national military might, 
and provide  for  the  common  defense,  the  United  States  financed  the 
Marshall  Plan and  helped  forge  the North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organiza-
tion  (NATO).  But external  economic  and military  aid  could  not  save 
Europe  indefinitely.  The continent's  political  and  economic  fabric  ap-
peared  to  need  radical  change.  Many  people  believed  that  it  was  the 
nation-state system  itself that was  delaying Europe's economic recovery. 
Europe's  First  Step  Toward Unity 
Some people advocated nothing less than an Atlantic federation,  marry-
ing the strength and optimism of America to an  exhausted Europe. But 
there was little support in the United States for sharing sovereignty and 
much fear on the part of Europeans that their distinctive cultures would 
be crushed in the embrace of the American giant. 
The  Atlantic  option  was  preempted  on  May  9,  1950,  when  Jean 
Monnet  and  Robert  Schuman  proposed  the  creation  of  a  European 
Coal and Steel Community (Ecsc) to be run by supranational European 
institutions.  Set  up in  1952,  the  Ecsc was  a  first  step  toward  an  eco-
nomically and politically united Europe. 
The US  Government  welcomed  the  initiative  and  gave  its  support 
to  the creation in  1958 of the European Economic Community  (EEC) 
and the European Atomic Energy Community  (Euratom).' The United 
States later supported the Community's enlargement, in 1973, to include 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. 
President Kennedy's  Grand Design 
American encouragement of Europe's search  for unity found its  fullest 
expression  in  President  John  F.  Kennedy's  Grand  Design  for  an 
Atlantic  partnership  between  the  new  Europe  and  the  United  States. 
The President summed up the mood of the times:  "We do not regard 
a  strong and united  Europe  as  a  rival  but  a  partner  .  .  .  capable  of 
playing  a  greater  role  in  the  common  defense,  of  responding  more 
generously  to the  needs  of poorer nations, of joining with the United 
States  and  others  in  lowering  trade  barriers,  resolving  problems  of 
commerce  and  commodities  and  currency,  and  developing coordinated 
policies  in  all economic and diplomatic areas.  We will be  prepared to 
discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming an Atlantic 
1  Technically,  the  European  Economic  Community,  together  with  the  European 
Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, comprise 
the  "European  Community"  or  "Communities."  Their  founding  members  were 
Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  and the  Netherlands.  Denmark, 
Ireland,  and  the United Kingdom  joined on January  1,  1973. 
8 partnership ... between  the  new  union  emerging in  Europe and  the 
old American union  founded  here  175  years  ago."2 
Internal Free Trade and a Common External Tariff 
The EEC is  based  on  a customs  union  backed  by  joint policies  to  pro-
mote economic integration. The customs union's most visible result has 
been  the removal of traditional economic  borders  and  barriers  in favor 
of a  larger,  more  efficient  continental  market.  By  July  1,  1968,  well 
ahead of the timetable set by  the EEC Treaty, the six founding members 
had achieved  free  trade  in  industrial goods,  had erected a common ex-
ternal tariff on imports of manufactured goods from non-member coun-
tries,  and had  begun  to  develop  a common  foreign  trade policy.  One 
of the first signs of this policy was the Community's participation, as  its 
members' representative, in tariff-cutting negotiations within the Geneva-
based  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT). 
The customs union is only one part of the Community's larger process 
of economic integration. Free movement of labor within the Community, 
the  continuing  attempt  to  dovetail  national  economic  and  monetary 
policies, the common competition policy, the common agricultural policy 
(CAP),  and  the  increasingly  sophisticated  economic  relationship  be-
tween the Community and developing countries are all examples of EC 
policies  which  extend  beyond  the  traditional  customs  union.  One  of 
these policies,  in particular,  has  often been  a source  of misunderstand-
ing in the United States-the farm policy. 
Common Farm Policy 
The Community's farm policy replaced the member nations'  nine sepa-
rate agricultural policies  with  a single policy.  It was  designed to  open 
up  agricultural  trade  among  member  states,  stabilize  markets,  guar-
antee  adeguate  supplies  at  fair  consumer  prices,  and  increase  the  effi-
ciency  of  Community  farming.  These  objectives  have  largely  been 
realized. 
A  policy of agrarian  reform has  also  been  launched  to  speed up the 
already  fast  decline  in  the  number of farmers  and  farm  workers.  The 
Community employs  13  workers  out of 100 in  agriculture,  while only 
four out of 100 American workers are on the land. For the first five years 
of the farm  reform  plan,  the  Community  earmarked  $900  million  to 
help  farmers  modernize  and  enlarge  their  holdings,  to  retrain  farm 
workers  for  jobs  in  other industries,  and  to  pay  older  farmers  retire-
ment pensions. 
The common agricultural policy is  based on common prices for major 
• Kennedy,  John F.  Independence Day AddreJJ, Philadelphia, Pa., July 4,  1962. 
9 products,  variable  levies  that  align  the  prices  of  imports  with  Com-
munity prices,  and  a common  farm  fund  that uses  proceeds  of import 
levies to buy farmers' produce when prices  fall below set prices. Import 
levies  protect Community  farmers'  income,  while  export  levies  benefit 
Community consumers  by  keeping scarce  products at home.  Part of the 
farm fund pays for farm modernization. 
Like farm policies around the globe, the CAP tries to protect farmers' 
incomes.  It thus,  necessarily,  gives  preference to  Community  farm pro-
duce.  The CAP  is  also  tilted against  major Community food  importers, 
like Britain,  Germany,  and Italy,  in  favor  of France  and  other export-
ing member countries. 
CAP: An American View 
The CAP  has  incurred the wrath of American  administrations  since  its 
creation.  Just after the opening of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotia-
tions,  the  US  Secretary  of  Agriculture  Earl  L.  Butz  summarized  US 
complaints in  the agricultural sphere in  the following manner:  "Some 
of our major trading partners-the Common Market and Japan particu-
larly-want to  negotiate  their  industrial  and  agricultural  sectors  sepa-
rately because they want to protect their highly subsidized agricultures ... 
we  gave  in  and  agreed  to  such  a  separation  in  the  Kennedy  Round. 
Barriers on manufactured goods were lowered-but our farm  products 
were held back  from  Western Europe,  Japan,  and other markets.  This 
unwise  strategy  in  the Kennedy  Round contributed  heavily  to  our re-
cent  balance-of-payments  problem  and  our  dollar  devaluations."3 
The situation is  not as  clear-cut as  US  critics indicate. Typical of the 
conflicting  point of view  is  the conclusion  by  another agricultural  ex-
pert:  "Even with obstacles  that the EC  erects  against imports,  with its 
high volume and  dependability,  it  is  still  a tremendous market for the 
American farmer. "4 
Commented  another:  ".  . . the key  to  greater stability in  the world 
market  for  both  the  United  States  and  the  [Community] ...  is  co-
operative negotiation,  such  as  is  taking place  in  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  in  Geneva.  Both  the  US and  EC  negotiators  realize  that 
to sell one also must buy."" 
Forging a common  agricultural  policy  was  an  essential  factor  in  the 
3 Butz, Earl L. Address at the Indiana Farm Bureau Convention, Indianapolis, Ind., 
December 10,  1973. 
'Thomson, Jim.  "Common l\farket Unhappy \'Vith US Protectionism,"  lVisconsin 
Agriculturalist, Racine,  Wis., November 8,  1975. 
• Doughty,  Tom.  "Will  We  Be  Selling  Less  to  the  Common  Market?"  The 
Farmer,  St.  Paul, !>..finn.,  December 1975. 
10 creation of the Community. It was demanded by France, one of the most 
efficient  farm  producers  in  the  original  Community,  in  return  for 
exposing French industry to its German competition. 
The CAP  cost  the Community $6 billion last year,  and a series  of re-
forms  are  now  being  weighed.  Suggested  improvements  involve  cost 
reduction,  market  balance  by  product  and  by  region,  and  long-term 
production and consumption forecasting. 
The Community's  farm  modernization  incentives  should  also  make 
it  increasingly  easier,  politically,  to  follow  an  economically  realistic 
farm policy.  But sweeping socio·economic changes  take  time. 
Some CAP Facts  and Figures 
The Community remains by far the best market for US  farm products. 
In  1975,  US  sales  of  farm  products  to  the  Community  amounted  to 
$5.6 billion, a quarter of all US farm exports.6 
The answer to recent US  balance.of-payments deficits  does  not lie  in 
EC-US farm trade. In fact, the Community has always bought more farm 
produce from the United States than the United States has bought from 
it. In 1974, the Community ran a farm trade deficit of $4.3 billion with 
the United States. 7 
In one area alone,  fats  and  oils,  the United  States  increased  its  ex-
ports  to  the  Community  of  Six  from  $96  million  in  1958  to  $937 
million in 1972, due mainly to the CAP's  encouragement of animal hus-
bandry  and  dairy  production.  In  1974,  US  exports  of  fats  and  oils 
(mainly  soybeans  and  cakes)  to  the  Nine amounted  to  $1.8  billion, 
despite the US temporary embargo on soybean exports.8 
The US share of the Community's agricultural market has also grown. 
In  1958,  the Community of Six  bought  21.3  per cent of US  farm  ex-
ports,  21.7 per cent in 1964,  and  22.4 per cent  in  1972.  In 1974, the 
Community of Nine bought  2 5 per cent of all US farm exports.  9 
The Nine: The World's Biggest Trading Power 
Successive  US  Administrations  attached  high  importance  to  Britain's 
casting its  destiny  with  continental Europe.  Clearly,  the United King-
dom's,  Ireland's,  and  Denmark's  accession  to  the  Community  was  an 
event of major importance to  the United  States  and  every  trading na-
• US Department of Commerce. 
7 According  to  US  Commerce  Department  statJstJcs,  US  imports  of  EC  farm 
products totaled $1.2 billion,  11.6 per cent of all  US  farm  imports in  1974. 
8  US  Department of Commerce. 
"Ibid. 
11 tion.10 The enlarged Community is  the world's most important trading 
power. 
In  1973,  the  first  year  of the enlarged  Community,  US  exports  to 
the  Nine reached  $16.7  billion,  23.5  per cent  of all  US  exports.  US 
exports  to  the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  and  Ireland  increased  by 
22  per cent,  25  per cent,  and  33  per cent,  respectively,  compared with 
24 per cent growth of total US exports.U 
These  figures  and  the  healthy  development  of  US-EC  commercial 
relations during the lifetime of the Community of Six  strongly suggest 
that the impact of the Community's  enlargement will  benefit  not  only 
US-EC  trade  but also  US  investments  in  the  Community,  which  make 
an  increasingly important contribution  to  the US  balance  of payments 
in the form of repatriated profits. 
New Members  Lo,wer  Their Tariffs 
Although the Community's  enlargement inevitably  broadened  the  area 
of tariff discrimination against  US  goods,  it lowered  the average  level 
of duties  on  American  exports  entering  the  combined  market  of the 
Nine.  The United Kingdom's  average  post-Kennedy  Round  industrial 
tariff level  of 7.6 per cent will drop to the Common Market's average 
level  of  7.0  per cent  by  July  1977.  The  average  US  industrial  tariff 
level is  7. 5 per cent.12 
Then, too,  the Community, under the GATT's  Article XXN-6 reduced 
tariffs  on  products  such  as  textiles  and  clothing,  paper,  photographic 
equipment, and pharmaceutical supplies, which the United States claimed 
would be raised  as  a result of the Community's enlargement. The Com-
munity  felt no obligation  to  do  so,  because  enlargement reduced  many 
tariffs  for  US  exports.  Generally  speaking,  the  trading  relationship 
between  America  and  the Community should continue  to  be  mutually 
beneficial. 
10 To prevent  the  reimposition  of tariff  barriers  as  a  result  of the  Community's 
enlargement, the Community  signed  free  trade  agreements  with  Britain's  former 
partners  in  the European  Free  Trade Association  (EFTA).  They  were:  Iceland, 
Sweden,  Portugal, Switzerland,  Austria,  Norway,  and  associated  Finland. 
"US Department of Commerce. 
"Tariff Study,  General Agreement on  Tariffs and Trade, Geneva,  March  1974. 
13 CHAPTER  II. 
Shared  Worldwide Economic Aid 
Res ponsi  bili  ties 
Since  the  postwar  recovery,  Community  members  have  cooperated  in 
giving economic  aid  to  the developing world.  The Community spends 
more of its national wealth on economic aid than does the United States. 
Preferential Agreements as Aid 
Bowing to the wishes expressed  by  the developing countries,  the Com-
munity also gives aid  by  encouraging them to export under generalized 
and specialized preferences. 
The Community's  imports  from  developing  countries  amounted  to 
$73.3 billion in  1974. The Community has consistently run  a deficit on 
trade  with  the  developing  world,  more  than  $31.3  billion  in  1974, 
while the United States traditionally runs a surplus.13 
13 Statistical  Office of the European Communities. 
14 OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FOREIGN TRADE-1974 
(billions of dollars}  •  Official Aid  11  Total Aid 
Japan 
3.0 
United States 
'.· 
.33 
.25 
.42  ' 
One  preferential  arrangement-the  Lome  Convention  grouping  46 
African,  Caribbean,  and  Pacific  (ACP)  countries 14-includes features 
to  stabilize  the  ACP's  export earnings. This convention  rationalizes and 
extends special trade relationships in  existence before Community mem-
bership  between  one  or  more  Community  members  and  the  ACP's. 
Eighteen of the ACP  countries are on  the United Nations  (UN) list of 
"poorest" countries. The per capita GNP  of these  18 countries averaged 
$148  in  1971,  compared  to  the  EC  average  of  $2,743  and  the  US 
average of $5,162. In  1973, the AcP's sold $6.2 billion of their exports 
to  the  Nine,  nearly  half their  total  exports."'  Had  special  trade  rela-
"  Bahamas,  Barbados,  Benin,  Botswana,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Centrafrican  Re· 
public, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial  Guinea, Ethiopia,  Fiji,  Gabon,  Gam· 
bia,  Ghana,  Grenada,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Guyana,  Ivory  Coast,  Jamaica, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 1\fadagascar. Malawi, i\-Iali,  Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, 
Nigeria,  Rwanda,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone.  Somalia,  Sudan,  Swaziland,  Tanzania, 
Togo,  Tonga,  Trinidad and Tobago,  Uganda,  Voltaic  Republic,  Western Samoa, 
Zaire,  Zambia,_ Surinam,  the Seychelles  Islands,  the Cornaro  Islands,  Sao  Tome/ 
Principe, the Cape Verde Islands,  and Papua New Guinea have asked  to  join the 
convention. 
15 Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
15 tionships not been continued with the newly enlarged Community, these 
nations would have been  forced  to  shoulder an even  heavier burden of 
economic problems. 
The  Lome  Convention  gives  the  ACP  countries  free  access  to  the 
Community market for 99.2  per cent of their exports.  Community de-
velopment  aid  during  the  five-year  life  of  the  treaty  will  total  more 
than  3.4 billion  units  of account  (U  A) ,'6  most  of it in  the  form  of 
grants.  An  additional  U A  400  million  has  been  earmarked  to  protect 
the ACP's  from sharp drops in prices or demand. 
Generalized Tariff Preferences 
Despite  its  preferential  agreements,  the  Community  was  the  second 
trading power (after Australia)  to enact a system of generalized prefer-
ences,  granting  developing  countries  tariff  advantages  on  their  in-
dustrial exports. This system went into effect  on  July  1,  1971, and has 
been  expanded  each  year  since  then.  The US  system  went  into  effect 
on January 1,  1976. 
Granting  developing  countries  tariff  preferences  by  industrialized 
countries  is  based  on the theory that between unequal trading partners, 
equality oppresses while unequal treatment restores  justice.  Tariff pref-
erences  involve giving up all  or part  of the customs  duties  levied  on 
goods  imported  from  specific  countries.  These  preferences  are  not  re-
ciprocal,  since  the beneficiaries do not have  to  reduce  their own tariffs, 
non-discriminatory because they are granted to all  developing countries, 
and generalized because they are to be granted by all developed countries. 
Under the  Community  system,  developing  countries'  manufactured 
and semimanufactured goods enter duty-free up to  tariff quota ceilings. 
The system has been expanded to include 104 countries and 43  depend-
encies and covered trade worth $2.88 billion in 1975. Tariff preferences 
are also  given to processed  farm  goods  and covered  trade  worth  $600 
million in 197 5. 
]oint Action on World Hunger 
The  Community  also  contributes  to  the world  food  aid  program.  In 
1975,  the  Nine supplied  1.3  million  metric  tons  of grain  under  the 
1968  Food  Aid  Convention,  compared  to  the  US  1.9  million  metric 
tons. Like the United States, the Community contributes other products, 
without any international commitment, to needy countries, and is  work-
ing on a worldwide stockpiling system within the UN Food and Agri-
culture Organization ( F AO) . 
16 One unit  of account  used  for  calculating  aid  is  defined  in  terms  of  a  basket 
of Community currencies.  Its  dollar value ranged from  $1.31  to  $1.16 in  1975. 
16 Some Not-Strictly Aid Assistance 
The Community  also  gives  aid  through  other  not-strictly  aid  arrange-
ments. 
Under the Mediterranean policy,  for instance,  trade and cooperation 
agreements  are  being  negotiated  to  end  discrimination  which  came 
about when the Community took  over France's special  links  with  Mo-
rocco and Tunisia. To avoid political partiality, the Community also has 
agreements  with Malta,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  and  Israel.  These countries  do 
a major part of their trade with the Nine, and most of them are either 
contiguous European nations or former dependencies of EC  members. 
Where  US  complaints  of  export  damage  from  preferential  agree-
ments  have  proven  justified,  the  Community  has  made  adjustments. 
This was the case  in the "citrus war," which the Community ended by 
making unilateral tariff concessions on citrus imports from June through 
September,  California's peak growing season.  Since  the  Mediterranean 
season  ends  in  May,  the Community could  make  this  adjustment with-
out harming  Spanish,  North  African,  and  Israeli  exports. 
The  Community  also  has  two  association  agreements,  with  Greece 
and Turkey,  two  countries  too underdeveloped to  aspire  to  full  mem-
bership in the early Sixties, but which could some day  join. Both agree-
ments provide development aid to strengthen these countries' economies 
and  allow  them  to  align  their tariffs  gradually with  the  Community's, 
more slowly than did the original members. On June 12, 1975, Greece 
asked to be considered for full membership. 
The Enlarged Community's Responsibilities 
Even  though  the  Community  is  proud  of its  record,  it  is  the  first  to 
admit that there is  always  room for improvement.  Its and its members' 
aid policies are  being sifted in the hope of improving the effectiveness 
of its  economic aid.  The enlarged Community is  convinced that "There 
can  be  no real  peace if the developed  countries  do not pay more heed 
to  the  less  favored  nations ... conscious  of their  responsibilities  and 
particular  obligations,  the  Nine  attach  very  great  importance  to  the 
struggle against underdevelopment. They are,  therefore, resolved to  in-
tensify  their efforts  in  the  fields  of trade  and  development  aid  and  to 
strengthen  international  cooperation  toward  these  ends."17 
17 Heads  of State  or Government  of  the European  Communities'  Nine  Member 
Countries.  Declaration  on  Europe's Identity,  Summit Meeting,  Copenhagen,  De· 
cember 14, 19-73. 
17 CHAPTER  III. 
Reducing International 
Economic Strains 
A number of prevalent assumptions in the United States color its  trade 
relations  with the Community.  These  assumptions  include: 
•  Imports  threaten  a  number of important US  industries  with  injury 
or ruin, and consequent loss  of jobs. Textiles, automobiles, shoes,  steel, 
and  consumer  electronics  are  the  industrial  sectors  most  often  cited, 
along with the dairy sector of agriculture,  as  being vulnerable. 
•  Many US  products can  no  longer compete in world  markets. 
•  The United States  is  the world's "most open" market. 
•  Successive US administrations played the role of the beneficent uncle 
and failed to obtain enough concessions in postwar tariff cutting talks. 
•  The  Community's  preferential  arrangements  with  less  developed 
countries (Loc's) are on balance bad. 
But despite  these  assumptions,  US-EC  relations  were  aimiable,  even 
idealistic  through  the  early  Sixties,  until  they  deteriorated  under  the 
pressures of economic change. Europe's continued economic and politi-
JH cal  recovery  was  in  the  national  interests  of the  United  States,  and  a 
close working relationship with the United States  was  in  the Commu-
nity's interests. However, few people on either side of the Atlantic were 
prepared  for  the  speed  of  international  economic  change.  Although 
the  United  States  never  became  poorer  or  weaker  in  absolute  terms, 
the  resurgent  Community  gained  economic  power  in  relation  to  the 
United  States.  As  Europe's  strength  grew,  American  complaints  pro-
liferated.  A  succinct  summary  of the  prevailing  mood  was  voiced  by 
a  senior  US  Senator:  "I  regret  that  the  European  Common  Market 
is  increasingly  taking  on  the  appearance  of a  narrow,  inward-looking 
protectionist bloc whose trade policies as  they affect agricultural as  well 
as industrial products increasingly discriminate against non-members."18 
Some European Complaints About US  Policy 
Some  Europeans  accused  the  United  States  of  dominating  the  world 
with its  technology, of exploiting the primacy of the dollar to  buy up 
European  industries,  and of protecting its  less  efficient  industries  from 
the first breath of international competition. 
It is  true that, like other nations, America protects its  economy. With 
more than  20 per cent of US  imports by  value controlled  by  voluntary 
or mandatory quotas and the US market surrounded by as many nontariff 
barriers as  most other trading powers have,  it is  hard  to see  how the 
United  States  could  be  termed  "the  last  open  market."  The  United 
States maintains quotas or similar devices on textiles, wool, cotton, meat, 
wheat,  and dairy products, among others.  Imports of other goods,  such 
as  steel,  have  been  restricted  by  enforced "voluntary" export restraints. 
It is  true, however, that the United States imposes fewer quotas  on  im-
ports from Japan  than  does  Western Europe. 
The US  average  tariff  level  of 7.5  per cent  is  slightly  higher  than 
the Community average of 7 per cent,  H•  but  the high peaks in the US 
tariff  schedules  are  more  restrictive  than  the  more  evenly  distributed 
EC duties. 
Some  US  Complaints  About European Policy 
American politicians and businessmen often accuse  the European Com-
munity of erecting new nontariff barriers  (NTB's)  to imports to replace 
the tariffs  reduced  in  the Kennedy  Round  of  GATT  negotiations.  The 
18 Javits, Jacob K. Congressional Record, Vol.  115,  No. 187,  November 13,  1969, 
s 14253. 
19 Op.  cit.  supra at  12. 
19 European  Community  sees  this  situation  differently. 
All  countries  have  rules  or  policies,  in  addition  to  customs  duties, 
which  may  restrict  imports  or favor  exports.  Most  of  these  practices 
were prompted by  domestic reasons  and only inadvertently affect  inter-
national trade.  Nontariff barriers include import guotas,  customs  valua-
tion  procedures,  public  procurement  policies,  border  tax  adjustments, 
antidumping regulations,  technical  and  health  regulations,  and  export 
subsidies.  A  GATT  working party  has  catalogued more  than 800 NTB's 
which may  restrict trade.  The United  States  has  its  share of NTB's,  as 
does the Community. 
Toward Protectionism or Liberalization? 
The US  Trade Reform Act of 1974 authorizes the Executive Branch to 
reduce  American trade barriers but also  eases  the path for new  import 
barriers.  The bill makes  it  easier  for workers  and  industries  to  collect 
adjustment  assistance  when  import  competition  causes  injury.  But  the 
bill also liberalizes the criteria for invoking the "escape clause"  to pro-
vide for increased tariffs or quotas when industries or workers can show 
that  imports  are  a  "substantial  cause  of  serious  injury,  or  the  threat 
thereof,"  to  the  domestic  industry.  "Substantial  cause"  is  defined  as 
being "important and not less  than any other cause." 
Using .the  new  legislative  guidelines,  the  US  International  Trade 
Commission  (formerly  called  the  Tariff  Commission)  in  early  1976 
determined that imports of footwear  and  specialty steels  were injuring 
those  two  industries.  Increased  tariffs  were  recommended.  for  foot-
wear and guotas  for specialty steel.  In  both cases,  the  guestion  of real 
injury  was  dubious  and  incomplete.  More  important  is  the  fact  that 
these  findings  could  encourage  other  industries  to  apply  for  similar 
protection, whether or not they have a legitimate need.  That the Trade 
Reform  Act  of 1974 has  whetted  the  appetite  of protectionist  forces 
by liberalizing and expanding the criteria for restricting imports can  be 
seen  by the fact that within 10 months of the bill's passage,  51  petitions 
for import relief had  been  filed.  This was  occurring while  the  overall 
US trade surplus was  reaching historic highs. 
US  Countervailing and Antidumping Duties 
The European Community is  disturbed  by  other protectionist measures. 
The US  Treasury Department imposes  "countervailing" duties on 11 
imports of goods allegedly benefiting from a "bounty" or export subsidy. 
The  US  countervailing  duty  statute,  unlike  countervailing  duty  prac-
tices of other nations and in conflict with  GATT  rules,  does  not  reguire 
20 a  determination  of  injury  to  an  American  industry.  The  Executive 
Branch has no flexibility in applying it. It must be imposed automatically 
whenever an  imported product is  found to  be  enjoying a bounty,  even 
if  it  is  a  mutually  beneficial  item  of  trade  which  does  not  harm 
American industry or employment. 
There has  been a slight decrease in the number of US complaints that 
the  Community  is  dumping  goods  (selling  them  at  below  domestic 
prices)  on the US market. But recent changes in the US  Antidumping 
Regulations  cause  the  Community  some  anxiety.  For  example,  one 
change allows the Secretary of the Treasury to determine the fair value of 
a  product  according  to  any  method  that seems  appropriate  to  him  in 
cases where the home market price of an  export is difficult to determine. 
Such  discretionary  leeway,  the  Community  maintains,  is  incompatible 
with both the GATT and the Geneva Antidumping Code,  both of which 
define  an  import's value  either  in  relation  to  the  price  on the  export-
ing country's market or in  relation to the export price to a third country 
or to the product's production cost. 
In  August  1975,  the  United  Auto  Workers  filed  the  biggest  anti-
dumping  complaint  in  US  history,  alleging  that  the  Community  and 
other car  exporters were  selling cars  in  the United  States  at prices  be-
low those on  their  home markets.  In  1974,  Community car  exports  to 
the United States  amounted to $2.5  billion,  as  compared with total US 
car imports  of $7.5  billion.  The Community,  expressing  regrets  about 
the  investigation,  pointed  out that  these  steps  were  being  taken  even 
though  "the  Treasury's  statement  itself  suggests  there  is  substantial 
doubt that imports are  causing injury to the US  industry" 20  and in the 
absence of a complaint by the industry. 
Speaking in favor of imports as  a damper on inflation, a distinguished 
American  economist  put his  finger  on  a  more  likely  cause  of the  US 
car industry's troubles:  " ... it was  imports which finally persuaded the 
US  automobile industry  to  at  least  begin  manufacturing smaller cars-
without which the energy crisis would  be  costing us  even  more dearly, 
in terms of both jobs and prices ....  " 21 
US  Customs· Assessment 
In the area of customs classification and nomenclature, most of the major 
trading  nations,  in  1950,  adopted  the  Brussels  Tariff  Nomenclature 
(BTN) which defines customs values  and prescribes a uniform system of 
20 Commission  of the  European  Communities.  Note  Ve•·bale  to  US  Department 
of State,  Washington, August  8,  1975. 
"' Bergsten, C.  Fred. Statement of the Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. 
Before the Trade Policr Staff Committee,  \X1ashington, July 28,  1975. 
21 duty assessment based on a standard nomenclature with a limited num-
ber of tariff schedules.  The United States  is  practically the  only major 
holdout, although the International Trade Commission is  studying ways 
of converting US tariffs into BTN. 
The current  US  system  retains  complicated,  arbitrary,  and  variable 
tariff structure that leaves  foreign  firms  exporting to the United States 
in doubt about the amounts of duty they will have to pay. This uncertain-
ty is compounded by arbitrary changes in classifications. 
A related problem for the foreign exporter is  the US  system of duty 
assessment. Under the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature, duties are assessed 
on  the sum  of cost,  insurance,  and  freight  ( CIF).  The United  States 
divides  imports  into  three groups.  Most  duties  are  levied  on the  free 
on board  (FOB)  price.  Some  500 categories of products,  however,  pay 
duties on the basis of their value in the home market or their FOB  value, 
whichever is  higher. 
For  organic  chemicals,  rubber  soled  shoes,  canned  clams,  knitted 
woolen  gloves  and  mittens  whose  value  does  not  exceed  $1.75  per 
dozen  pairs,  for  instance,  the  duty  is  based  on  the American  selling 
price  (ASP).  ASP  is  the wholesale price of comparable American  prod-
ucts,  including all expenses and profits,  as  determined by the American 
industry concerned. 
In practice,  ASP  boosts  the value  by  which  duties  are multiplied  by 
anything  from  twice  to  four  times  the  invoice  value  of the imported 
product.  It gives  American  producers  an  ironclad  price  advantage  in 
competing with imports. In the field of synthetic organic chemicals where 
sales are made in bulk,  price is  the decisive  element in competition.  In 
the  dye  field,  for  example,  US  duties  are  assessed  on  "standards  of 
strength" determined as of July 1,  1914. This practice doubles or triples 
the  level  of the  US  duty.  The ASP  system  violates  the  GATT. 
The history  of the  controversy  over  ASP  illustrates  a  more  general 
problem  which  confuses  foreign  nations  trading  with  the  United 
States-the way in which the US constitutional system itself places them 
in double jeopardy. 
In 1967, in the concluding days  of the Kennedy Round trade nego-
tiations,  the American  negotiators  agreed  to  abolish  ASP  in  return  for 
substantial reciprocal concessions  by  the Community, Britain,  and other 
nations.  But  as  the  new  round  of multilateral  trade  negotiations  ap-
proached,  at  the end of 1972,  the Congress had still  not approved the 
repeal  of ASP,  and  the  Community  withdrew  its  offers  of additional 
concessions.  A  number of Congressmen have taken the position that in 
repealing ASP,  the United States would be giving away  one of its only 
nontariff barriers  for nothing and should instead use  it to  bargain  for 
further concessions.  In  other words,  the horse should  be  sold  twice. 
22 This problem led  more  than  one veteran of trade negotiations  to  in-
sist that any  future  international negotiation on nontariff barriers  must 
be preceded by a grant of authority from the US Congress to the Ameri-
can negotiators. 
DISC:  Export  Subsidy  Ot'  Competition  Equalizer? 
Another  US  action  has  figured  in  US-EC  discussions  on  export  sub-
sidies:  the  tax  deferral  on  50  per cent  of  export  profits  granted  to 
Domestic International Sales Corporations (msc's). There are more than 
7,300 of them,  handling exports worth $98  billion. 
The Community and  other exporting powers  maintain  that  the  DISC 
constitutes  an  export  subsidy,  outlawed  by  Article  xvr  of the  GATT. 
The United  States  replies  that  countries  such  as  France,  the  Nether-
lands,  and  Belgium  have  had  similar  provisions  for  years,  and  that 
since  taxes  will  eventually  be  paid,  msc cannot  be  considered  a  sub-
sidy.  Complaints  have  been  filed  with the  GATT;  bilateral  US-EC  con-
sultations have been held, and there the matter rests. 
Other Barriers to Free Competition 
For the Community and other exporters, obstacles to entering the Ameri-
can market abound. There is  the Buy  American  Act of 1933 which  di-
rects the Executive Branch to give a preference to American over foreign 
goods in government buying. Price differentials,  which can  be  changed 
at  any time by Executive Order, currently are 6 per cent to  12  per cent 
for civilian US government agencies  and  50  per cent for military pro-
curement at home or overseas.  In addition to the general provisions of 
the Buy  American  Act,  more  than  90  per cent  of procurement  under 
US  foreign  aid  programs is  restricted  to  purchases  of American  prod-
ucts.  Moreover,  a  growing  list  of  states  are  enacting  Buy  American 
rules of their own. 
Administrative,  technical,  health,  and  sanitation  regulations  further 
shield the  American  market.  In addition, since  1955  the United States 
has enjoyed a general waiver exempting its  farm trade restrictions from 
GATT rules. 
There probably will continue to  be  friction  in these and other areas. 
Indeed,  such  friction  is  the  inevitable  by-product  of the  Community's 
growth  in  strength  and  cohesion.  Nevertheless,  many  Americans  wel-
come the emergence of a strong and unified European economy and see 
in  it  opportunities  for  strengthening  the  machinery  of  international 
cooperation. 
23 CHAPTER  IV. 
Revitalizing the EC-US Economic 
Partnership 
The United States  and the European Community are the two giants of 
the world  economy.  Together,  they  account  for  half the world's  gross 
national product of about $5 .1  trillion and just under half of the world's 
exports. In 1974, the volume of US-EC trade was $34 billion, of which 
$19.4 billion was  US exports. 
Between  partners  of such  size,  economic  frictions  inevitably  exist. 
But the waters of partnership run deeper and wider than economics.  In 
his "New Atlantic Charter" speech of April 23,  1973, US  Secretary of 
State  Henry  A.  Kissinger  stated:  "The alliance  between  the  United 
States and Europe has  been  the cornerstone of all  [American]  postwar 
foreign policy,  provided the political framework for American  engage-
ments in Europe, and marked the definitive end of US  isolationism .... 
It was  the stimulus  for  an  unprecedented  endeavor  in  European  unity 
and the principal means to  forge the common policies that safeguarded 
Western security in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation. Our 
24 values, our goals, and our basic interests are  most closely identified with 
those of Europe."22 
A  Pattern of Trade Cooperation 
The common  interests of Europe  and  the  United States  in  the postwar 
period were  born out of the  national security considerations  associated 
with the advent of the  Cold  \X'ar.  These  same  common  interests  have 
matured so that they now include economic interests. 
The successful end of two major rounds of tariff-cutting exercises  in 
the Sixties-the Dillon and  Kennedy  Rounds  had two far-reaching re-
sults.  The rounds demonstrated not only  the Community's commitment 
to  certain  GATT obligations concerning the  creation  of customs  unions 
but also its desire to reduce its common external tariff. These two policies 
of internal  free  trade and  reduced  external  tariff  barriers  have  been  a 
major factor in  the unprecedented rate of increase  in US-EC  and world 
trade in the past 15 years. 
"'Kissinger,  Henry  A.  AddreJJ  to  the  Associated  Press,  New York,  NY,  April 
23, 1973. 
22 One  trade  unit  of  account  equaled  51.00  in  1958·71.  $1.085  in  1972,  $1.25 
in  1973-74, and $1.32  in  1975. 
25 In 1975,  the Community took  21.2  per cent of US  exports and pro-
vided 17.3 per cent of US  imports. 
The US-EC  Dialogue's  C1·owded  Agenda 
The  leadership  role  in  the  management  and  development  of interna-
tional  economic  relations  which  the  Community and  the  United States 
still exert has  quickened  the  pace  of mutual efforts  to  seek  multilateral 
cooperation. 
Right  now,  these  two  economic  super  powers  are  participating  in 
the most  ambitious series of trade liberalization  negotiations  ever held. 
The so-called  Tokyo  Round  of  GATT  talks  is  proof  of  dedication  to 
reduce further not only tariff barriers but also nontariff barriers to trade. 
The ability  of the  United  States  and  the  Community  to  reach  agree-
ment will clearly play  a large part in  the outcome of the talks. 
Other current  multilateral  economic  negotiations  concern  industral-
ized countries' efforts to  transfer resources  to  the poorer countries most 
seriously  affected  by  higher  oil  prices.  A  number of international  re-
cycling  and lending arrangements have  already  been  agreed upon.24  In 
addition,  the United States  and the Community have  been  working to-
gether closely  in  the Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and De-
velopment  (  OECD)  to  devise a code of good behavior for multinational 
enterprises. 
Further  efforts  are  under  way  to  increase  consultations  on  overall 
economic policy coordination.  The November 1975  summit meeting in 
Rambouillet,  France,  emphasized  the  need  for  better  management  of 
economic  interdependence,  a  fact  driven  home  by  the  recent  simulta· 
neous swings in the international business cycle. 
Restoring International Economic Order 
The strength and value of the US-EC  partnership were tested through-
out the  early  Seventies.  Neither side  fully  listened  to  the other's com-
plaints;  neither  fully  appreciated  the  swift  pace  of international  eco-
nomic  change.  Against  this  background  of trans-Atlantic  insensitivity, 
President  Richard  M.  Nixon  promulgated  a  "New Economic  Policy" 
on August 15, 1971. The international measures-suspension of dollar-
•• These arrangements  include:  the OEco's  $20  billion  "safety net,"  the  IMF's  $5 
billion  Special  Drawing  Rights  (soR's)  Oil  Facility,  the  Community  system  of 
borrowing up to  $3  billion on  international  capital  markets,  and  the United Na-
tions'  Secretary  General's  Special  Account  for  Emergency  Operations  in  favor 
of the  world's  poorest  countries.  The latter  account,  to  which  the  oil  exporting 
countries contributed $32  million  and  the Community pledged $500 million, was 
to collect $3  billion. 
26 gold convertibility and an  import surcharge-abruptly ended the inter-
national  monetary  system  negotiated  at  Bretton  Woods  in  1944  and 
upset the pattern of international trade cooperation. 
The US import surcharge removed most concessions obtained through 
the careful balancing of interests in trade talks.  In the interest of avoid-
ing a trade war,  the Community did not retaliate.  It began negotiations 
with the United  States,  though  preoccupied  at  the  time  with  enlarge-
ment negotiations  and  with  plans  for  the  closest  economic  unity  ever 
tried by sovereign countries. 
One  immediate effect  of the  Nixon  move  was  the  start  of a  series 
of  international  monetary  negotiations  to  realign  the  exchange  rates 
of  the  world's  currencies.  The  resulting  Smithsonian  Agreements  of 
December 1971, together with a second  dollar devaluation, in February 
1973,  greatly  lowered  the  value  of the  dollar  relative  to  most  of the 
EC  countries'  currencies.  The  gradual  improvement  in  the  US  trade 
balance has  been due largely to  these exchange rate  realignments. With 
US  exports  now  cheaper  on  the  world  markets  and  imports  more  ex-
pensive in  the  domestic  market,  a  US  trade  deficit  of $2.3  billion  in 
1974 was transformed into a $11.1  billion surplus in  1975. 
The realignment of exchange rates  led  to  still another agreement be-
tween  the  United States  and  the  Community  countries  on  how much 
exchange rates would be allowed to fluctuate in the future. A basic agree-
ment at the Rambouillet summit soon  led  to a formal agreement by the 
International  Monetary  Fund  members  to  opt  for  a  monetary  system 
which  avoids  the  rigidities  of the old fixed  rate  system  and the uncer-
tainties of a freely  floating  rate system. 
The search  for  a  "new  world  economic  order"  continues.  Of  the 
period  ahead,  EC  Commission  Vice  President  Henri  Simonet  com-
mented:  " ... there is  a very  large area  of common  interest to  be built 
on, provided that each  party respects  the  reality  of the  divergencies  of 
interest which are no less present." 25 
""Simonet,  Henri.  Addrns to the Foreign  Affairs  Club,  Oxford University,  Ox-
ford,  England, December  5,  1974. 
27 CHAPTER v.  Communication 
As the search for new international rules continues, a willingness to com-
municate has been restored. The high stakes involved in keeping EC-US 
relations harmonious include other efforts at cooperation. 
Semiannual  "high  level"  consultations  on  common  problems  have 
been  inaugurated  between  senior  officials  of  the  Community  and  the 
United  States.  Both  sides  have  acknowledged  the  value  of  these  op-
portunities to discuss the full range of mutual interests. 
Responding to  the  need  for  a  closer  institutionalized  dialogue,  the 
Community,  in  the  fall  of 1971,  established  an  official  Delegation  in 
Washington.  Informal contacts  have  also  been  given renewed  attention 
by  exchanges between  US and  European legislators.  At the end of one 
such  visit  to  the  United  States,  a member of the  European  Parliament 
commented:  "We came to the United States with all  of Europe's prob-
lems on our minds. Now we are richer. \Xle  return with all the problems 
of the  United  States."  The  then  House  of  Representatives  Majority 
Leader,  Hale  Boggs,  concurred  in  the  usefulness  of these  exchanges: 
28 "The more you  meet people,  the more  the  prospects  for  solving prob-
lems  improve.  If you  don't  do  anything,  you  know  nothing will  im-
prove." 26 
Dialogue Needs  Institutions 
These contacts continue as  the United States and the Community  focus 
on  the  GATT  trade  negotiations.  One  European  thus  summed  up  the 
problem of communication: 
"The conditions  of dialogue  between  Europe  and  the United States 
exist.  But organizations barely exist.  This dialogue will  necessarily  take 
place  on  the  economic  :md  monet:try  plane,  and  one  must  hope  that 
it  will  not  be  a  dialogue  of the  deaf.  However,  on  the  political  and 
military level,  everything depends on  progress  within Europe itself." 27 
This has  been one of the difficulties in US-EC relations,  the difficulty 
of  dialogue  between  two  partners  of  comparable  size  but  of unequal 
political  authority.  \Xfith  its  enlargement  to  nine  members,  the  Com-
munity overnight became one of the world's leading commercial powers. 
But unless  it achieves  some degree of political  integration, it could  be-
come "an economic giant without a political head,  incapable of defend-
ing itself, a monster \vhose very survival would be in question." 28 
The  Community's  present  system  for  delegating  authority  to  its 
negotiators  sometimes  looks  unwieldy  to  outsiders,  but  the  American 
system is  no less a puzzle to many Europeans. Commented one of them: 
"It is  often hard to  ascertain  who in  the United States  is  influential in 
making what decision and how." But, he admitted,  "in the final  analysis 
there is  always  the President \vho  speaks  for America.  , 
29 
Compromise Is Essential 
Although the  broad  outline of common  US-EC  interests  has  emerged, 
negotiations  will  exact  concessions  from  both  major  trading  partners. 
But  the  common  interest  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  is  so  deep 
and pervasive that any approach to  dealing with shared problems means 
"'European  Commrmi1y,  No.  158,  European  Community  Information  Service, 
\Xfashington,  August-September  1972,  page  ). 
"Laloy,  Jean.  "Does  Europe  Ha,·e  a  Future'"  Foreign  A/fain,  October  1972, 
page 161. 
28 Reverdin,  Olivier.  Report  on  the  Political  Consequences  of  the  Enlargement 
of  the  European  Economic  Communitv.  Consultative  Assembly  of  the  Council 
of Europe, Strasbourg, France, I\fay 4,  1972, page 2. 
'" Dahrendorf,  Ralf.  "Ten Voices  for  Europe  Is  Nine Too Many,"  Vision.  Jan-
uary 1972, page 59. 
29 the acceptance of common goals. These goals must be fixed high enough 
so that the dialogue cannot lapse into conflict. 
As  EC  Commission  Vice  President  for  external  affairs  Christopher 
Soames put it: ". . . if a close relationship and a mutual understanding 
between  Western  Europe and  North  America  were  vital  in  the  years 
of wartime danger and of peacetime political tension,  they are  no less 
vital  now  when  the world's  economy  has  to  adjust  itself  to  a  highly 
uncertain future." so 
30 Soames,  Christopher.  AddreJS  Before  the  European  Parliament,  Strasbourg, 
France,  January  16,  1974. 
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Ad valorem duty. A customs duty levied as  a percentage of a product's 
assessed  value. 
ASP. American Selling Price.  A US customs valuation procedure where-
by  the US  wholesale price,  instead  of the foreign selling price,  is  used 
as  the  basis  for  assessing  customs  duties.  Applies  to  benzenoid  chem-
icals,  rubber-soled  footwear with fabric uppers,  canned clams,  and cer-
tain wool knit gloves. 
CAP. Common agricultural policy.  The Community's farm policy which 
is  designed  to  rationalize  agricultural production and establish  a  Com-
munity-wide  system  of supports  and  import controls.  The  CAP  covers 
more than 95  per cent of the Community's agricultural production. 
CET. Common external tariff. The Community's common customs tariff 
which replaces  those of its  nine members. 
Commission.  The policy-proposing  arm  of the  Community's  dual  ex-
ecutive. 
Council of Ministers. Enacts  laws  and sets  policies based on proposals 
by  the Commission. 
Countervailing duty.  An  import  charge  designed  to  offset  an  export 
subsidy  by  another country. 
Customs  union.  A  group  of countries  that eliminates  tariffs  on  trade 
between  its  members and adopts  a common  tariff on imports  from  the 
rest of the world. 
Disparity.  A  significant  difference  in  tariff rates  between  countries  on 
identical products. 
EEC.  European Economic Community. See EC. 
EC.  European  Community  or  European  Communities.  The  collective 
name  for  three  "communities"  created  by  three  different  treaties:  the 
European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity, and the European Atomic Energy Community.  Founding mem-
bers were  Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Germany,  the Netherlands,  and Lux-embourg. The United Kingdom,  Ireland, and  Denmark joined on  Jan-
uary 1,  1973. 
EFT  A.  European Free Trade Association.  Founding members were the 
United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Austria, 
Portugal,  and  Icehnd.  Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom  withdrew 
after deciding to  join the Community.  Finland is  an  associate  member. 
Free trade area.  A group  of countries  that  eliminates tariffs  on  trade 
between its  members  but which  does  not adopt a common tariff on  im-
ports from the rest of the world. 
GATT. General Agreement on  Tariffs and Trade. An  international ac-
cord, signed in 1948, to foster growth of world trade. Provides a forum 
for  multilateral  tariff  negotiations  and,  through  semiannual  meetings, 
a means for settling trade disputes and for discussing international trade 
problems. Has more than 80 members. 
Generalized tariff preferences.  Preferential tariff  treatment for  manu-
factured  and  semimanufactured  goods  from  developing countries.  The 
Community's system,  begun in 1971, covers some processed agricultural 
products as  well. 
IMF.  lnternatioml Monetary  Fund.  Organization  established  in  1947 
to promote international monetary stability through consultation and co-
operation. 
LDC. Less  developed country. 
Lome  Convention.  Convention  assooatmg  the  Community  with  46 
African,  Caribbean,  and  Pacific  (ACP)  developing countries.  The con-
vention provides UA 3.4 billion in aid over a five-year period which in-
cludes  a UA 3  75  million  export stabilization  fund  and  about  UA  2.6 
billion in financial  aid.  The treaty allows 96 per cent of ACP  exports to 
enter the Community free of import duties and quotas. The remaining 4 
per cent of ACP  farm products receive  preferential access.  The ACP  give 
the Community  MFN  treatment.  The pact  was  due to go  into force  on 
April1, 1976, for a term of five years. 
MFN. Most-favored-nation. The policy of nondiscrimination in interna-
tional  trade which provides  to  all  nations  the  same  customs  and  tariff 
treatment as given the so-called "most-favored-nation." 
MTN.  Multilateral  Tariff  Negotiations.  The  Tokyo  Round,  which 
opened in Tokyo in  September 1973,  is  being conducted at GATT  head-
quarters in Geneva, Switzerland. 
NTB. SeeNTM 
NTM. Nontariff measure,  formerly  known  as  NTB's  or nontariff  bar-
35 riers.  A  practice other tlnn the use of customs  tariffs  which  restricts or 
distorts trade. 
Safeguards  clause.  Outlines  the  conditions  under which  trade  restric· 
tions that had been relaxed in negotiations may be reinstated. 
SDR.  Special  Drawing Right.  An International Monetary Fund unit of 
account  based  on  :t  "basket"  of  16 currencies.  Its  dollar value  ranged 
from $1.20 to $1.18 in  1975. 
Tariff  preference. Tariff treatment that favors  certain  products  from a 
country or group of countries. 
Tokyo  Round.  The  current  round  of  GATT  negotiations.  The  main 
forum for the Tokyo Round is  the Trade Negotiating Committee, form-
ed to :tllow non-members of the GATT to participate in the negotiations. 
UA. An EC unit of account, the basic accounting unit. Its value averaged 
$1.32 in  1975. 
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